Realism in Social Science

Positivism, Naturalism and Anti Naturalism in the Social Sciences 1971

This paper sets out, in embryonic form, the overall argument of Social Theory as Science: that many of the arguments against the possibility of the social sciences sharing their aims and methods with the natural sciences depend on assuming a specifically positivist conception of science, and that they fail when this is replaced, as it should be, by a realist one.

A Critical Examination of B F Skinner's Objections to Mentalism 1972

This paper evaluates the objections to ‘mentalistic’ explanations presented by the radical behaviourist, B. F. Skinner, for whom any explanations appealing to people’s beliefs, purposes or desires are inherently unscientific. It is argued that his position depends on an unduly restrictive understanding of science and of the role of theoretical concepts in scientific explanation.

STS Chs 1-3 Conceptions of Science 1975

This file contains the three chapters comprising Part I of Social Theory as Science. They deal in turn with positivist, realist and conventionalist conceptions (or 'philosophies') of science, articulating their differing views on issues such as the nature and role of evidence, the aims of scientific enquiry, the nature of explanation and its relation to prediction, the possibility of objectivity, the extent of rationality, and so on. Whilst the author's sympathies are clearly with the realist position, the primary aim is to describe and analyse the three positions, so that in later parts of the book it will be possible to explore what social enquiry based on a realist conception of science would be like, and how far it would avoid objections to its positivist counterpart.

STS Ch 7 The Explanation and Understanding of Human Action 1975

The first of the three chapters comprising Part III of Social Theory as Science, this begins by considering philosophical debates about whether everyday explanations of individual action in terms of an agent's 'reasons' can be regarded as a form of causal explanation, and then more generally whether psychological states can also be thus regarded. Both questions are given affirmative answers, provided that a realist rather than positivist view of explanation is accepted. It goes to consider the nature of 'hermeneutic' understandings of social meanings and language, arguing that these are distinctive of social science yet do not require the rekection of causality and objectivity.

STS Ch 9 Values Theory and Reality 1975

The third of three chapters in Part III of Social Theory as Science, the core elements in Max Weber’s conception of value-free social science are defined and defended, including the logical independence of explanatory claims from political or moral judgments. It is argued that this independence from normative judgments also implies independence from judgments about the truth or rationality of people’s beliefs, and certain arguments for relativism about reality and reason are considered and rejected.

STS Notes and Bibliography 1975

PST Contents and Bibliography 1981

PST Introduction 1981

This introduction to The Politics of Social Theory presents an outline of Habermas’s theory of knowledge-constitutive interests, with its distinctions between three forms of human knowledge and their respective constitutive interests. It locates this radically non-realist conception of knowledge in the broader context of the Frankfurt School’s conception of critical social theory and its critique of positivism, and outlines the main lines of critical argument developed in the following chapters.

In this chapter I argue that the critique of positivism developed by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School conflates several distinct elements under the heading of ‘positivism’: along with a specific conception of scientific knowledge, there is the ideal of a scientific politics; value-freedom, i.e. the separation of science from values; and 'scientism', the view that only science provides genuine knowledge. It argues that value-freedom neither entails nor requires scientism, and instead provides a basis for rejecting, rather than supporting, the scientisation of politics. (This is a revised version of a 1980 paper with the same title, included in Value-Free Social Science. In that paper, 'scientism' is termed 'epistemological positivism').

PST Ch 3 Knowledge, Objects and Interests 1981
This chapter from The Politics of Social Theory examines Habermas’s claim that the object-domain and criteria of validity of the empirical-analytic sciences are constituted by the human interest in technical control. It argues that his attempts to justify this claim generate irresolvable problems, and that his position prevents one recognising the distinctive character of different kinds of objects in the natural world.

PST Ch 4 Psychoanalysis and Human Emancipation 1981
This chapter from The Politics of Social Theory examines Habermas’s view of psychoanalytic theory as, like critical social theory, rooted in self-reflective processes guided by an emancipatory interest. It argues that in defending this view Habermas misrepresents Freud’s concept of the id, by ignoring the role of the instincts, and misconceives the kind of autonomy that psychoanalysis may reasonably aim to achieve.

PST Ch 5 Theory and Practice in Psychotherapy 1981
Debates about the scientific status of Freudian theory, and the relationship between the adequacy of that theory and the effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapy, are examined in this chapter from The Politics of Social Theory. Habermas’s view that psychoanalytic theory should not be seen as an empirical science is criticised for its simplistic model of science, as is Karl Popper’s rejection of Freudian theory as unfalsifiable.

PST Ch 6 and Conclusion 1981

In this final chapter of PST, 'The Complexity of Norms of Norms of Practice, I argue that Habermas's conception of psychoanalysis as self-reflection fails to recognise the full range of normative issues involved in its practice. I go on to criticise the adequacy of his account of consensus  in an ideal speech situation as a basis for normative judgments, and explore parallel difficulties in Rawls's account of 'the orginal position'. In the Conclusion I both summarize the main claims made in PST, and respond to various possible objections, including my reliance throughout on a realist conception of social science.

The Critique of Objective Thought 1991
This extract from Understanding Phenomenology explores Merleau-Ponty’s critique, in Phenomenology of Perception, of what he calls ‘objective thought’: the ‘scientific’ view of the world as consisting in causally related objects with determinate properties and locations. His criticisms of ‘empiricist’ and ‘intellectualist’ versions of objective thought are examined, along with his use of these criticisms to reject realism and idealism and to show how phenomenology differs from these.

Phenomenology and Scientific Realism 1991
The phenomenologists’ rejection of scientific realism is examined in this extract from Understanding Phenomenology. Husserl’s view of modern science as based on abstraction from the lifeworld is criticised for its instrumentalist conception of science; the difficulties in avoiding anthropomorphism are explored; and it is argued that scientific explanation is compatible with recognising the distinctive nature of human experience.