

reference to a normatively specified therapeutic goal, I am not endorsing the view that the means-ends relationship can be straightforwardly mapped onto the science-values dichotomy.<sup>32</sup> For not only will the norms that specify a particular goal be relevant also in evaluating the legitimacy of the means for achieving it; but *other* norms may also be relevant to this evaluation. In the case of therapeutic technique the same is true. For instance, even if our primary therapeutic goal is the relief of distressful feelings (such as anxiety or depression), it does not follow that the only relevant standard in evaluating techniques is their 'effectiveness' in achieving this. Suppose, say, that the use of electro-convulsive or chemo-therapy could be shown to relieve depression: we might still legitimately reject such techniques on other grounds, such as the absence of self-reflective engagement by the person treated, the power-relations involved in the therapist-patient relationship, and so on. It is entirely mistaken to claim, as some advocates of these techniques seem to, that objections on these grounds merely counterpose 'value-judgements' to effective practice'. For effectiveness cannot be specified independently of values, and the character of a therapeutic technique, as well as the goal to which it is said to contribute, must be subject to normative evaluation.

## 6 The Complexity of Norms in Practice

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A recurrent theme in the normative vocabulary of critical theorists is a series of related contrasts between two kinds of social practice. On the one hand there is domination, manipulation, control, technical rationality and distorted communication. On the other there is emancipation, autonomy, self-reflection, reason and undistorted communication. Critical social theories are said to be concerned with a critique of the former, aimed at the realization of the latter. I have argued that it is a mistake to construct an epistemological account of critical social theory that ties its criteria of validity to the successful realization of emancipatory values. But I now wish to challenge what might be called the 'normative naivety' displayed in the way these values have often been specified and justified. In particular, whilst Habermas's work marks a significant advance over some earlier attempts to do this – especially in his more recently developed theories of truth, the normative presuppositions of communication, and the ideal speech situation, which I will discuss later in the chapter – it nonetheless fails to recognize the complexity of normative issues in social practice. I shall begin by indicating this complexity in the context of a particular form of practice, psychotherapy, through discussion of a number of examples of different therapeutic situations.

### 1 THE POLITICS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

We can usefully identify three different dimensions of a therapeutic process, within each of which normatively significant issues arise:

- (1) The nature of the goal, and thus of what counts as a successful therapeutic outcome.
- (2) The kind of technique that is employed.
- (3) The form of relationship between 'therapist' and 'patient'.<sup>1</sup>

Habermas's account of psychoanalysis, which he presents as a model for the general character of practices guided by a critical social theory, can be seen to specify the ideal form of these dimensions as follows:

- (1) The therapeutic goal is emancipation, or *autonomy*, understood as the elimination of compulsive, unconsciously determined patterns, and the achievement of directly intelligible conscious-purposive activity and communication.
- (2) The techniques must involve *self-reflection* by the patient, who comes to understand the sources of his or her distorted communications in a previously repressed life-history.
- (3) The analyst-patient relationship is one of *enlightenment*, in which the analyst uses access to psychoanalytic theory to aid the patient in a self-reflective process. Patients, it is assumed, come to the analyst through their own choice and desire for change.

To this picture of psychoanalysis we can counterpose a type of therapeutic situation which appears to display a quite antithetical character in each dimension: the use of behaviour-modification regimes in, say, an institution for 'emotionally disturbed adolescent offenders' convicted of legal offences.<sup>2</sup> Here, attempts are made to alter behaviour patterns defined as socially undesirable by controlling the contingencies of reinforcement: that is, by determining which activities are to generate 'rewarding' consequences, such as money, privileges, or cigarettes. In terms of the three-dimensional framework, such a therapeutic process would look like this:

- (1) The goal is to eliminate 'maladjusted' behaviour, this being defined by people other than the patients.
- (2) The technique involves no significant element of self-reflection: it consists in controlling the environmental variables influencing behaviour, and at most relies upon

- a degree of rational calculation of consequences by the patients.
- (3) The analyst relates to the patient through an institutionally supported a-symmetry of power, and makes no use of theoretical knowledge to enlighten the patient.

So here we have a type of therapeutic process which represents the complete antithesis of Habermas's favoured case of psychoanalysis. And there are other examples which would display a similar contrast – for instance, the use of compulsorily administered drugs in the same kind of institutional context. However, without denying the significance of this contrast, we must not be misled by it into accepting an exhaustive and exclusive dichotomy between two sorts of therapeutic process. Rather, we must recognize both that the normative character of each dimension may vary independently of the others; and that within each, there is a complexity of issues that is not captured by critical theorists' normatively dichotomous concepts. Both points will be illustrated by considering a number of therapeutic situations that differ from the two so far presented.

First, consider someone who decides to alter their own behaviour by the use of the same kinds of modification techniques as in the second example. In order to stop smoking, say, this person tries to organize his or her environment so that behaviour incompatible with the activity is reinforced, and the existing reinforcements for smoking are removed. (A similar case would be someone, or some couple, who made use of Masters and Johnson techniques to deal with a problematic pattern of sexual activity.<sup>3</sup>) Here, despite the absence of self-reflection, there is also an absence of any dominative power relationships between analyst and patient. It is a freely chosen, self-administered behaviour modification programme; and any theoretical knowledge involved is directly used by the patient. (In this respect, we might even prefer this to the psychoanalytic situation where, as I will point out later, problematic issues about power and control may well arise.) The therapeutic goal seems not to be autonomy, but simply the elimination of an undesired pattern of behaviour: indeed the patient might be quite happy to

substitute a different, equally compulsive pattern (say, chewing gum) for the previous one. Nor is it obvious why this should be regarded as objectionable, or inferior to the goal of autonomy – the patient, in effect, ‘autonomously’ decides that one compulsive pattern is better replaced by another. Further, it may be that the initial pattern is seen as undesirable partly because it interferes with the patient’s successful pursuit of other potentially autonomous activities.

Consider now another type of therapeutic situation. The patient, suffering some standard set of neurotic symptoms, decides to seek help from a therapist who uses techniques and theories derived from Reich’s earlier writings.<sup>4</sup> In particular, the therapist believes that childhood episodes of repression leave their mark in both psychic and somatic forms. Thus an important therapeutic technique is the identification of various muscular rigidities and distortions in the patient’s body, and the attempt, by physical manipulation, massage and breathing methods, to release some of the unconscious feelings and emotions which are present in the patient’s bodily ‘armouring’. In this way, repressed elements that are embedded (both literally and metaphorically) in the patient are brought to the surface, and their compulsive power eventually overcome, with corresponding changes in musculature and posture.

How is this therapeutic process to be characterized, in the three-dimensional framework? The goal, we may say, is emancipatory; and the therapist makes use of a privileged access to theoretical knowledge in guiding the process. But it would be difficult to claim that the technique was self-reflective, at least in the same way that Habermas presents psychoanalysis as being. A lot of what the therapist does involves direct intervention upon the patient’s body. Indeed, in one ordinary sense of the term, this body is ‘manipulated’ by the therapist, at times quite painfully. And, more generally, the therapist is likely to pay as much attention to what the patient’s body reveals – for instance, in tensions, types of facial expression, movement, vocal qualities and so on – as to what the patient actually says. The overcoming of resistance may take a somatic form, with a physical struggle between therapist and patient. (Incidentally, according to

Reich this would not involve a metaphorical use of the term ‘resistance’; if anything, its usual psychological sense should be seen as metaphorically derived from this physical form.<sup>5</sup>)

To some extent, however, this contrast between Reichian technique and Habermasian self-reflection is too strongly drawn, since elements of the latter may also be manifested in this kind of therapeutic situation. Somatic techniques may be used to identify (and partly to discharge) feelings whose sources in the patient’s life-history then become subject to reflective processes – though it remains the case that Habermas’s picture of self-reflection is extremely rationalistic and non-experiential by comparison with the Reichian alternative. Further, some of the features of the power-relationship between analyst and patient that can be present in psychoanalysis (and which Habermas’s concept of ‘enlightenment’ perhaps tends to obscure) may also be shared here. My next example is partly designed to focus on this issue.

Consider two people who agree to act as co-counselling partners, with perhaps a fairly vague aim of understanding themselves better. They both attend a course, learning about the theory and technique of co-counselling; or perhaps they read a therapeutic self-help manual.<sup>6</sup> The basic structure of their co-counselling sessions is that each takes it in turn to be ‘patient’ and ‘therapist’ respectively, specifying, when patient, what kinds of interventions they wish the therapist to make. This might vary from complete passivity on the part of the therapist to quite active engagement – for instance, suggesting possible connections between things the patient has said, asking him or her to repeat some phrase with apparently powerful emotional undertones, or offering to take part in an acting-out exchange. At the end of the session, each partner comments on how useful or otherwise the other’s interventions have been.

I will assume that both the goal and the technique of this process correspond fairly closely to Habermas’s account of psychoanalysis. But what of the patient-therapist relationship? It might be argued that one of its advantages, by comparison with the standard psychoanalytic situation, is that various a-symmetries of power are removed or reduced

in the co-counselling process. Each may 'enlighten' the other in turn, but not on the basis of any privileged access to theoretical knowledge or supposed expertise. If either one, as patient, becomes suspicious about the motives of the other, as therapist, this can be challenged and dealt with on the basis of a presumed equality; so the risk that therapists may protect themselves from acknowledging how their own feelings toward the patient are affecting the therapeutic exchange is reduced. Similarly, the therapist becomes vulnerable to the patient, by engaging also as a patient in this reciprocal process.

To present this comparison in terms of 'advantage' is, of course, to suggest that there may be important considerations which count against the desirability of what Habermas describes as a relationship of enlightenment. It is worth distinguishing two possible objections to this relationship. One is that the standard psychoanalytic situation is prone to various abuses, such as the therapist's antipathy to the patient being concealed under the guise of impersonal expertise, or the therapist's failure to recognize, say, his or her own projections on to the patient. The other is that even without such abuses, the very structure of the relationship is undesirable since it involves a number of important inequalities, especially those of expertise and emotional vulnerability. These may of course be reduced or outweighed by other features of the psychoanalytic relationship: for instance the requirement that therapists undergo a training analysis, or the 'fact' that the professional analyst does have theoretical and technical knowledge without which the patient cannot achieve self-understanding. The point I wish to make, though, is that these are problematic questions, to which differing normative commitments are relevant, and they cannot be resolved by simply endorsing the psychoanalytic relationship as one of 'enlightenment'.

There is another aspect of this comparison between the therapeutic situations of co-counselling and psychoanalysis that raises a further general issue about the normative character of therapeutic processes. In co-counselling the equality between the partners basically takes the form of reciprocity. The two people exchange roles: but the role-

differentiation itself is not removed (unlike, to some extent, my earlier example of imposing upon oneself a behaviour modification programme). There is therefore some sense in which each, as therapist, treats or regards the other as an 'object'. That is, each in turn relates to the other in a way which, whilst difficult to specify precisely, seems to involve elements of what critical theorists might regard as a 'technical' interest or attitude.

What I have in mind is that this therapeutic attitude involves the suspension of many important features of normal personal interactions. The therapist is expected to avoid reacting to what the patient says or does in terms of its personal significance for the therapist. The focus is exclusively upon the patient's life, not the therapist's. The kinds of feelings, emotions and judgments which in 'normal' contexts would be generated in the therapist by the patient's actions and communications are kept in abeyance. The therapist's task is to try to understand what is going on for the patient, and to intervene in ways that will aid the therapeutic process. There is a suspension of what Strawson has usefully described as 'the reactive attitude';<sup>7</sup> and the therapist's own interests, which might otherwise often conflict with the patient's, are regarded as inappropriate bases for his or her responses to the patient.

The character of this therapeutic attitude may be further illustrated by introducing one more example of a therapeutic situation, the encounter group.<sup>8</sup> Here, in effect, the rules are that the reactive attitude should have priority – indeed, in an unusually heightened form since in everyday life this attitude is often suppressed, with varying degrees of awareness that this is being done. Of course, the encounter group situation is a special or artificial one, in that the normal consequences of reactive displays in everyday life are themselves partly suspended: the rules legitimate such responses, and protect people from various sanctions that would in other contexts probably apply to them. Further, the encounter group may have a leader, who practices the therapeutic attitude towards the members of the group. But in other such groups, of a self-help kind, the role of therapist may be permanently or temporarily abandoned; and I shall consider only this special case.

In this situation a therapeutic process may occur, with the goal of autonomy, and with at least partially self-reflective techniques, but with no therapist-patient relationship. Members of the group help one another towards the therapeutic goal; but not by the adoption of what I have described as the therapeutic attitude. Instead, they do this as it were 'unintentionally': at the level of their immediate motives in relating to others, they adopt a reactive and not a therapeutic attitude. At another level, of course, they may be making a mutual commitment to aiding one another in the therapeutic process. They offer to each other, as their contribution to this goal, their own feelings and responses. In this respect, therefore, the leader-less encounter group differs from the other examples by the absence of an 'objective' therapeutic attitude.

This contrast between objective and reactive attitudes suggests that the concepts of manipulation, control and so on, often characterized in terms of the idea of treating or regarding a person as an 'object', are highly complex and problematic. What we have, in effect, are a number of quite different senses of manipulation or control, and their absence, many of which correspond to equally distinct contrasts between 'person' and 'object'. I will now identify some of these, making use of the preceding discussion of different therapeutic situations.

First, manipulation or control may be said to occur where one party to a relationship is invested with various kinds of coercive authority or power, such that the other party's wishes, interests or goals are permitted to determine their actions only when they accord with the former's. My example of the behaviour modification regime in an offenders' institution displays this type of relationship. But it also displays a quite different kind of manipulation, the treating of persons as 'objects' in the sense that their feelings, deliberations, aims and so on are systematically ignored by the exclusive focus upon physically describable behaviour, without reference to any so-called 'mentalist' features.<sup>9</sup> However, this form of 'viewing people as objects' is not a necessary element in relationships involving the previous sense of manipulation. For that kind of a-symmetry of power

may be maintained in a way that takes full account of the 'inner life' of the dominated party – which is why psychological torture is often so effective, in both the cells of the police State, and the recesses of family life. We might put this point by saying that many forms of manipulation actually require that someone is viewed as a 'person', not an 'object'.

But in yet another sense of manipulation, namely direct intervention and control of someone's body, manipulation may occur in situations free from this kind of power relationship, as in the somatic techniques of Reichian therapy. Of course, here the patient's body is not regarded exclusively as a physical object, in that the 'embodied' sensations, feelings and emotions are also crucial elements in this process. None the less, certain other elements of the patient's non-physical being are much of the time accorded little significance, such as the deliberative and rationalizing processes that he or she normally relies upon outside the therapeutic situation. Yet it may be that it is precisely by means of this kind of 'manipulative' process that the ideal of autonomous existence can be achieved. Thus, here, treating the person as an 'object' is the way of realizing an emancipatory goal: though in doing this it may also be discovered that our nature as humans is far more closely tied to our bodily existence than previously recognized.

This last point is related to my discussion in section 4 of chapter 3 of the diversity of forms of being, and the error of defining humans only in terms of their species-distinctive characteristics. For some ways in which the contrast between 'person' and 'object' is drawn fail to recognize these points. (Incidentally, such contrasts between persons and things may tend to legitimate ways of relating to non-human living beings that take no account of their sensations, feelings and so on – such as factory-farming). I argued in that chapter that the properties defining different object-domains should not be seen as constituted by different interests. It can now be added that, in trying to identify the normatively significant features of therapeutic processes (and indeed other kinds of social practice), the distinctions between technical, practical and emancipatory interests are inadequate, since we cannot

differentiate the various types of therapeutic situation in these terms alone. For instance, what I have described as the therapeutic attitude, which seems to be endorsed in Habermas's conception of enlightenment, could in one sense be said to display a technical, objectifying interest. Yet at the same time there are other, equally significant forms of control or manipulation in therapeutic situations which require for their conceptualization different senses of 'object', 'control' and so on. Thus, I do not think the typical normative vocabulary of critical theory can deal with the complexity of norms in practice.

Having examined this contrast between emancipatory and objectifying or manipulative attitudes, we are in a position to comment on the claim made by critical theorists that a positivist social science is unacceptable because it must display the latter when used as the basis for social practice. There are several distinct issues here. First, I see no reason why a positivist social science can only be used in situations characterized by the kinds of power a-symmetry discussed above, involving either institutionalized coercion, or relationships based upon the assumption of differential degrees of theoretical expertise. Second, though, it does seem possible to argue that social practices guided by such a science may be unable to recognize many of the characteristics of humans that distinguish them from other 'objects', both inorganic and organic. This is because, as I noted in section 2 of chapter 1, the positivist conception of science typically limits a science's ontology to what is observable; and items such as human emotion or deliberation tend thereby to be excluded as scientific objects.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, for example, I doubt whether psychoanalytic theory can be accepted as genuinely 'scientific' from a positivist standpoint, since so many of its central concepts (such as the unconscious, or resistance) seem not to satisfy positivist requirements for the admission of theoretical terms into science. If psychoanalytic theory is to be used as a basis for therapeutic practice, we would at least have to accept a theoretical realist conception of science in place of positivism. None the less, a social theory that 'recognizes'

human capacities such as emotion or deliberation can itself be used in ways that are, in important senses, dominative, manipulative and suchlike. A subtle understanding of human motivation and feelings can provide the 'ideal' means by which individuals or groups maintain their control over others. And conversely, the kind of knowledge produced by a positivistically conceived social science, such as behaviouristic psychology, can be used in situations involving egalitarian social relationships and the uncoerced choice by individuals as to how they wish to change their lives. The ontological adequacy of theories, and the normative acceptability of their employment, are thus in many respects quite independent questions.

There is one final aspect of therapeutic practices that I will mention, which raises several questions about the use of psychotherapy as a model for the relations between critical social theory and political practice. This concerns the specification of the goal of a therapeutic process. So far I have said little about this, except for noting some distinctions between the elimination of compulsiveness, the relief of unwanted or distressful feelings or patterns of behaviour, social adjustment and self-understanding. But clearly there are many further issues that arise in this context, and which have a number of moral and political dimensions. Consider, for instance, the example presented in the last section of the previous chapter, in which a man 'discovers' during a therapeutic session that he feels insufficiently protected or nurtured in his present relationships with women, perhaps due to the character of his childhood familial experiences. What are the possibilities now open to him? He might decide – perhaps on the suggestion of the therapist – that he will try in future to be more demanding in his relationship with his wife. Indeed, he might also discover that he finds it emotionally difficult to make such demands; and he might be aided in this respect by further therapeutic techniques. So off he goes to his home, and proceeds to make precisely the kinds of demands of his wife that, viewed from a certain normative standpoint, exemplify a general pattern of domination of women by men, one feature of which is the ascription of

nurturing, emotionally supportive roles to the former.

Alternatively, in this same example, suppose the following happens. The man discovers that his childhood-rooted pattern of anxiety in relation to certain other men is preventing him from achieving some kind of satisfaction that requires a sense of effectiveness and personal contribution in his working life. Having rid himself of these debilitating anxieties, he goes off deciding to assert himself by, for instance, borrowing some money and setting up as an entrepreneur. Later he finds that his therapeutic experience gives him the necessary confidence to 'stand up for himself' when confronted by trade union negotiators. And all this is encouraged and reinforced by his therapeutic experience.

So this 'successful' therapeutic process produces someone who is better able to contribute to the reproduction of dominative sex-role differentiation, or of capitalism. As I argued at the end of the previous chapter, 'success' can only be defined by reference to moral and political values; and these are relevant not only to the character of the patient-therapist relationship and therapeutic techniques, but also the goals of the process. But this last dimension itself involves issues that go well beyond debates about the relative merits of autonomy, adjustment, or the relief of distressful feelings. For it also involves questions about sexism, socialism, individualism and so on. To ignore these questions is to fail to recognize the normative complexity of the therapeutic process. To think that they can be resolved by specifying the ideal of a critical social theory as 'emancipation' is simply naive.

The fact that the conduct of therapeutic processes involves these kinds of political and moral issues also suggests that one should be sceptical about the possibility of using an account of psychoanalysis as a model for other areas of critical social theory and political practice. Of course, the legitimacy of doing this depends partly on just which features of psychoanalysis are being proposed as a model for what; and I find it difficult to get clear about which are the analogies Habermas intends to draw. For instance, he seems at times to suggest a parallel between the 'critique of ideology' and the

psychoanalytic 'critique' of neurosis, partly through his conceptualization of both ideology and neurosis as forms of 'distorted communication', and partly through the suggestion that both involve 'unconscious' processes.<sup>11</sup> But this latter point, at least, is misleading. For on Habermas's reading of Freud, the unconscious is identified with the repressed; and this is one important reason for his claim that a necessary condition for the truth of psychoanalytic interpretations is their acceptance by the patient. For in accepting such interpretations, the patient is recovering something that had been temporarily 'banished' from consciousness.<sup>12</sup> But the same is not true of ideology: the 'victims' of ideology may in some sense be said to be 'unconscious' of certain things, but surely not of things that they had at one time been conscious of, and then repressed. To free oneself from ideology is not to recover a lost element of one's past.

Further, the implausibility of conceptualizing ideology by analogy with the repressed unconscious suggests that one cannot directly use the psychoanalytic concept of autonomy as the overcoming of compulsiveness, in order to specify the goal of a critique of ideology. Instead, we should view this kind of critique as involving the criticism of forms of consciousness and social practice by reference to normative ideals or values, many of which are quite distinct from a conception of emancipation based upon the character of psychoanalysis. For, as my last examples were intended to show, achieving therapeutic autonomy is consistent with the adoption and practice by an 'emancipated' patient of attitudes and values that are by no means unobjectionable. And I do not see how their acceptability or unacceptability can be determined without going well beyond the normative concepts supposedly illustrated by the model of psychoanalysis.

However, in his more recent work Habermas has attempted to develop a theory of the rational foundation of norms which involves many concepts and claims that have not been examined up to this point. So I turn now to consider these.

## 2 COMMUNICATION, TRUTH AND THE IDEAL SPEECH-SITUATION

For critical theorists, positivism removes the possibility of a rational critique of society. I argued in chapter 1 that whilst this might be so for some positivist doctrines, it is not for others: in particular, the value-freedom of science. And in chapter 2, I presented a conception of value-free social theory that was at least compatible with the rationality of values, which could themselves then function in social theory in a way that preserved the independence of its criteria of validity from normative commitments. In now examining Habermas's attempts to provide a rational foundation for normative claims, this view of the relation between science and values will be assumed. Indeed, it seems that Habermas himself may now have abandoned some of his earlier claims about the distinctive criteria of validity for critical social theory. For instance, McCarthy notes that in *Legitimation Crisis*, 'his analysis does not exhibit the type of theory-practice relationship delineated in his [earlier] methodological writings.'<sup>13</sup> This, I think, is correct; and though I will not argue the case here, I believe that the theoretical programme articulated in that book, and in other writings since then, could be encompassed within the kind of epistemological reconstruction of critical social theory that I have been advocating.

Two main components can be identified in Habermas's work towards a rational foundation for normative claims.<sup>14</sup> First, there is an argument which links participation in communicative activity with the anticipation of what he calls an 'ideal speech situation', whose existence requires the realization of certain normative ideals such as the absence of ideological distortions and asymmetries of power. The crucial intermediary steps in this argument involve his consensus theory of truth, and the place of what he calls 'discourse' in the validation of truth-claims. Second, he argues that this ideal speech situation also provides the procedure through which rational decisions about the normative issues involved in the organization of society can be made. I will examine these arguments in this and the

following section, respectively. Throughout, there are two basic questions that concern me: how successful is Habermas in establishing the values he intends to; and how adequate would these be, if established, as a basis for resolving the kinds of normative issues that typically arise in moral and political decisions?

Habermas believes it possible to construct a theory of 'communicative competence', a 'universal pragmatics' which identifies the universal rules presupposed in human communication, in addition to those involved in syntactical competence.<sup>15</sup> Drawing on Austin's and Searle's work in the philosophy of language he argues that all speech acts presuppose four types of 'validity claims', concerning comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness (roughly, the speaker's honesty or sincerity) and rightness (roughly, appropriateness in relation to relevant norms). The goal of any communication is to reach an 'understanding' (*Verständigung* – the precise meaning of this term will be discussed in the following section), which consists in 'the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and accord with one another'.<sup>16</sup> Habermas argues that if in the course of ordinary communicative interaction this goal is not achieved, it will be necessary (at least in the case of truth and rightness claims) for the participants to move to a special form of communication which he terms 'discourse'.

In discourse, every assumption of the disputed claims becomes open to question and critical discussion. For truth claims, we have 'theoretical discourse', and for rightness claims, 'practical discourse'. Both require the existence of an ideal speech-situation, whose basic characteristic is the absence among participants of every motive other than 'the unforced force of the better argument'.<sup>17</sup> But this general requirement can only be met if a number of specific conditions are realized. There must be no barriers to open communication arising from repressed motives or self-deception; there must be no relations of domination or control between the participants; and there must be a genuine equality in the opportunities for each to engage effectively in the discursive argumentation.

This account of the discursive validation of problematic claims is used by Habermas to construct a consensus theory of truth for 'theoretical' statements (roughly, scientific statements), according to which their truth consists in what would eventually be agreed upon as a result of discursive argumentation in an ideal speech situation. For instance, he says that 'the *truth* of a proposition stated in discourse means that everybody can be persuaded by reasons to recognize the truth claim of the statement as being justified';<sup>18</sup> and that 'I may ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if every other person who *could* enter into a dialogue with me *would* ascribe the same predicate to the same object'.<sup>19</sup> He regards this as preferable to both pragmatic and correspondence theories: the latter, in particular, he rejects because of its naive objectivism about the relationship between language and reality.<sup>20</sup> However, the merits of Habermas's position as a theory of truth are not altogether relevant to a concern with its possible use for the rational foundation of norms, as I will now argue.

It will be helpful to distinguish three different elements in a theory of truth. First, there is the definitional question of the meaning of 'truth', 'true', etc.: that is, of specifying what truth consists in, what it is for a statement to be true. Second, there is the question of what standards or methodological rules can be used in assessing the truth or falsity of a theoretical claim. Third, we may also be concerned with what kinds of social institutions or procedures are best suited to the successful, rational application of those standards; and with whether these social requirements can only be fulfilled given the existence of further features of social or political organization external to the immediate context of scientific argumentation.

Now, although it seems that Habermas intends his consensus of theory of truth to provide an answer to the first of these questions, it may be that even if it fails in that respect (as I think it does, for reasons which I will not go into here<sup>21</sup>), it is none the less acceptable as an answer to one of the other questions. In particular, I suggest it should be considered in relation to the third, concerning the social requirements for the optimum application of the standards appropriate for the

assessment of truth-claims. There is, though, a slight problem here in interpreting Habermas's view of these standards. From what he says, it is not always clear how specific these are to particular types of discourse. That is, it might be that he adopts only a general account of critical argumentation, applicable to all theoretical and practical discourses; or that he also accepts, for instance, specific criteria governing the assessment of evidential support for theories in empirical-analytic science, which differ from those in hermeneutic-historical science, and from those appropriate to practical discourse. In what follows I shall assume the latter interpretation.<sup>22</sup>

We can now present Habermas's argument for the rational foundation of norms. Engagement in communication requires that certain validity claims are established. Where doubt arises about any of these – in particular about truth claims – recourse must be had to discursive argumentation. The successful operation of the standards applied in theoretical discourse requires the existence of an ideal-speech situation. So this situation, the norms it involves, and whatever further social conditions are necessary for their realization, are in effect entailed by communicative activity. It is not consistent, therefore, both to engage in communication and to reject these values. But humans are necessarily communicative beings, so they are implicitly committed to these values.

There are a number of steps in this argument that may be questioned. First, even if communicative activity does involve the validity claims Habermas specifies, it is not clear that engagement in this activity requires commitment to the possibility of their discursive assessment. As Habermas himself notes, the institutionalization of theoretical discourse is by no means a culturally universal phenomenon. In Western Europe, for instance, he seems inclined to identify its emergence, at least in the case of empirical-analytic knowledge, with the rise of modern science.<sup>23</sup> There are, as it were, many societies which manage without theoretical discourse. However, this by no means disproves this step in the argument: that people fail to recognize what is presupposed or entailed by what they do, is both logically

possible and a familiar occurrence.

It may be helpful here to consider the way Apel has defended a position very similar to Habermas's.<sup>24</sup> Like Habermas, he contrasts his own position with Popper's 'critical rationalism', which in many respects parallels both his and Habermas's. Popper, whilst endorsing the claim that rationality consists in the possible subjection of any statement to the process of critical argument, in which every assumption is open to challenge and refutation, argues that one cannot provide a rational justification for engaging in this kind of process in the first place. There must be an initial non-rational commitment, a 'leap of faith'. Apel argues that this is a mistake on Popper's part, and is due to his failure to extend the concept of rationality to the presuppositions of *communication*, as distinct from the more restrictive view that rationality consists only in the deductive validity of relations between *statements*. That is, whilst Apel accepts that no deductive proof of the necessity for critical argumentation can be provided – at least, none with premisses that are themselves unchallengeable – he believes it possible to show that, from the intrinsically social-pragmatic standpoint of communication, the unavoidability of commitment to the practice and norms of critical argument can be established.

I shall not pursue this issue any further. Instead, I shall go on to examine the later moves in the overall argument assuming, in effect, that it is addressed to those who do accept the need for discursive validation of truth-claims.<sup>25</sup> The main question I wish to focus upon is whether it is true that the ideal speech-situation is a necessary condition for the optimal application of the relevant standards of critical argumentation in theoretical discourse. To answer this, it will be helpful to make a rough distinction between two sets of features that together define the ideal speech-situation, which I will term 'psychological' and 'political'. The latter consists in requirements such as the absence of a-symmetries of power, and the existence of equal opportunities for participation, which I will discuss shortly. In the case of the former, the guiding principle is that participants should be motivated solely by 'the unforced force of the better argument', or,

as Habermas puts it elsewhere, 'all motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded'.<sup>26</sup> It would seem that this is intended to rule out at least the following sorts of motivation: those involving unconscious influences, and those displaying certain forms of self-interest. But it is by no means obvious that either of these requirements is necessary for successful theoretical discourse.

Consider, for instance, the frequent expression of unconscious (or at least unacknowledged) aggression or defensiveness in intellectual arguments. It may well be that this is an undesirable feature of the personal interactions involved in argumentation, but I am doubtful whether what makes it objectionable is that the rationality or truth of the outcome is thereby undermined. Or consider the possibility that there is a connection between engagement in certain forms of intellectual activity, and typical manifestations of the anal character, namely parsimony, orderliness and obstinacy.<sup>27</sup> Is it plausible to maintain that these unconscious psychological influences would necessarily distort the outcome of rational enquiry: might they not instead produce a useful degree of tenacity and determination for the individual's engagement in this activity? To put the question more generally, is the obsessional compulsive intellectual less likely, other things being equal, to make positive contributions to theoretical discourse? Further, if we accept Freud's view (noted in section 2 of chapter 4) that the unconscious is not to be identified solely with the repressed, and that its primary processes may well improve the operation of conscious activities, Habermas's requirement would seem to be potentially counter-productive.

Similar doubts arise for the elimination of personal interests. It might be argued that, say, the pursuit of prestige, or personal hostilities, or religious convictions, can often motivate people to engage successfully in theoretical discourse. For instance, accounts of major episodes in the history of science often seem to reveal that, hidden beneath the official picture of scientific activity as determined by an impersonal pursuit of truth, we find instead just these kinds of personal motives.<sup>28</sup> Yet this need not be seen as undermining the rationality of science. For it could be

claimed that the impersonality of the standards for scientific argumentation does not require a corresponding impersonality of individual motives. Instead, the need is for an institutional framework in which any distortions that do arise from such sources can be detected and challenged. But the successful functioning of the framework does not necessitate a particular set of motives or attitudes on the part of individual participants, however desirable these might be for other reasons.

Turning now to the political dimensions of the ideal speech-situation, I again confine myself to indicating some possible difficulties in Habermas's position. These can be brought about by presenting what are, in effect, three competing models for the social organization of theoretical discourse. Two of these, which I will call 'liberal' and 'conservative', could be seen as represented (very) roughly by the positions of Popper and Kuhn. The third, which I will call 'radical', is intended as a possible interpretation of Habermas's position.

According to the liberal model, the social organization of theoretical discourse should parallel the system of rights typically advocated within the political theory of liberalism. These would include: freedom of speech and thought; the absence of discriminatory practices based on religion, sex, race, property, income, occupation and so on; equal opportunity to hold office; the assessment of proposals or claims on their intrinsic merits and not on the personal or social characteristics of their authors; and the making of decisions by reference to explicitly stated impersonal criteria, whose application to particular cases is open to public discussion and criticism. To borrow Popper's phrase, this organization should display the features of an 'open society'; and it may also be argued that this can only be guaranteed for theoretical discourse if the same features are present in the wider society.

The radical model, by contrast, can be understood by analogy with a particular kind of critique of liberalism. According to this, liberal rights can only be made effective (that is, effectively equal) by removing social and economic inequalities which undermine the ability of certain groups or individuals to actually use their formal rights. For example,

the radical argues that the equal right to free speech can only be effectively exercised if everyone has full access to the resources necessary for their views to be widely heard and listened to, such as newspapers and television; and this itself might well require an equalization of income, wealth and education. Further, it will be necessary to eliminate the various asymmetries of power and authority which prevent people's opinions being genuinely taken account of. To have the right to say what one likes is of little value if the opinions expressed have no chance of affecting the decisions being made. Thus equal rights require also the equalization of material resources, power, authority and so on. So the radical model of the ideal speech-situation for theoretical discourse involves analogues of the conditions necessary for the effective equality of liberal rights in the organization of society; and these conditions may also be argued to require implementation not only within the organization of theoretical discourse, but outside it also.

Whereas the radical model takes liberalism as its starting-point, and then radicalizes it, the conservative model entirely rejects many of the central features of both – indeed, it in effect rejects the ideal of discourse. Its starting-point is that the rationality of decisions cannot be specified in terms of the impersonal application of rules. Instead, the concept of rationality is analysed in terms of the judgments of individuals or groups vested with a certain form of authority, which is not itself justifiable (or challengeable) by reference to abstract standards. What is reasonable is what those with the appropriate authority judge it to be. And although such judgments may later be revised, we are not to accept a view of theoretical discourse according to which all assumptions are open to doubt and criticism at any time, with every member of the relevant intellectual community having an equal right to dispute or reject its basic principles or beliefs. The community itself is hierarchically organized; and those who enter it must undergo a lengthy period of apprenticeship, in which they acquire skills and expertise through their relationships with more authoritative members. Finally it may be argued, as in the case of the liberal and radical models, that for this social organization of theoretical

discourse to succeed, similar features must be present in the wider society.

I will not attempt to evaluate these three models, though I believe there are plausible elements in each of them. But I want to emphasize two points. First, if Habermas is to justify his advocacy of the ideal speech-situation, which is I suggest represented roughly by the radical model, he must show that this is in fact preferable to the others. Second, the justification that is offered has to take a specific form: it must be shown that the radical model represents the optimal organization for the effective validation of truth-claims. For his argument is designed to provide a rational foundation for various norms, on the basis of what is required for the validation of the claims presupposed by communicative activity. Thus no appeal can be made to normative considerations whose justification is given independently of this argument. If the acceptance of certain norms is to be based on the requirements of successful communication, one cannot at the same time determine the merits of possible forms for its social organization by reference to other ideals.

The significance of this can be brought out by considering one more view of the organization of theoretical discourse, advocated by Feyerabend.<sup>30</sup> A central feature of his position is that one should not first specify the requirements for scientific rationality, and then read off the normative implications for social or political organization from these. Rather, one should proceed in the reverse direction: what kind of scientific practices we adopt should be determined by ideals of social existence. That is, the social organization of theoretical discourse should be assessed, not by reference to the supposed requirements for achieving truth or rationality, but by its effects upon human beings. The pursuit of truth has no exclusive priority as a human value: freedom, pleasure, self-realization and so on, may be of equal or greater importance. Thus the political argument should not be from science to human values, but from human values to science.

Again, I will not comment on the merits of this position: clearly, if it were accepted it would undermine the primary assumption of this attempt by Habermas to provide a

rational foundation for norms. But there is anyway a less extreme view than Feyerabend's, which would also reduce the plausibility of Habermas's arguments. This is that although it may be possible to establish (or at least give some positive support for) certain norms on the basis of what is required for the optimal conduct of theoretical discourse, or indeed any form of communicative activity, these norms do not provide anything like a full account of the basic values relevant to the solution of moral or political issues. That is, whatever the merits of this argument for certain values, there may well be other values, of equal significance, that cannot be justified in this way. Further, such additional values may at times conflict, both with each other, and with those established via the requirements of theoretical discourse.

For instance, suppose it could be shown that to maximize the successful operation of critical argumentation, far-reaching measures would have to be taken to remove inequalities of power or material resources. It might then be objected, from some normative standpoints, that this could only be done at considerable cost in terms of the realization of other important values, such as the maximization of economic production, or the absence of a coercive State apparatus.<sup>31</sup> In other words, there may be a plurality of moral and political values, which are not mutually harmonious.<sup>32</sup> Instead, there are situations in which they conflict, and there may be no 'higher' level of normative analysis at which these conflicts can be correctly resolved. So, in response to Habermas's declaration, in an early version of his argument for the normative implications of communicative competence, that the various symmetries required for successful communication represent 'a linguistic conceptualization of what are traditionally known as the ideas of truth, freedom and justice',<sup>33</sup> the following query could be put: is it possible to realize these values without conflicts between them; and even if so, is their realization compatible with that of other, equally important ideals?

However, to assess the legitimacy of these doubts we must examine the second main element in Habermas's account of the rationality of normative claims, his theory of practical discourse. Here the concept of an ideal speech-situation is

used in a rather different way, to specify directly a procedure by which such claims can be rationally justified.

### 3 THE RATIONALITY OF PRACTICAL DISCOURSE

In practical discourse the claims to rightness made in communicative activity are subjected to critical argumentation, just as the claims to truth are in theoretical discourse. So, in parallel with his view that the truth of theoretical claims consists in what is agreed in an ideal speech-situation, Habermas proposes that the rightness of practical normative judgments is established by consensus in that same situation.<sup>34</sup> Further, corresponding to the standards or principles of argument appropriate to theoretical discourse, there is a basic principle for practical argumentation, namely 'the generalizability of interests'.<sup>35</sup> This principle, however, does not require independent justification, for it is in fact presupposed by the ideal speech-situation, which is itself required for the successful resolution of problematic communicative claims.<sup>36</sup>

Most of the basic features of Habermas's position here are presented in the following passage from *Legitimation Crisis*:

If under these conditions [i.e. an ideal speech-situation] a consensus about the recommendation to accept a norm arises argumentatively, that is, on the basis of hypothetically proposed, alternative justifications, then this consensus expresses a 'rational will'. Since all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in the practical deliberation, the 'rationality' of the discursively formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioural expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a *common* interest ascertained *without deception*. The interest is common because the constraint-free consensus permits only what *all* can want; it is free of deception because even the interpretation of needs in which *each individual* must be able to recognize what he wants becomes the object of discursive will-formation. The discursively formed will may be called 'rational' because the formal properties of discourse and of the deliberative situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus can arise only through appropriately interpreted, generalizable interests, by which I

mean needs that can be *communicatively shared*. The limits of a decisionistic treatment of practical questions [i.e. one that maintains the non-rationality of ultimate normative commitments] are overcome as soon as argumentation is expected to test the *generalizability* of interests, instead of being resigned to an impenetrable pluralism of apparently ultimate value orientations (or belief-acts and attitudes.)<sup>37</sup>

As Habermas has himself noted,<sup>38</sup> this position is in many respects similar to that of John Rawls, in *A Theory of Justice*.<sup>39</sup> By taking up this suggested parallel we will be able to identify a number of difficulties in Habermas's view. Rawls argues that one can provide a rational justification for certain principles of justice – namely, the equality of liberties and opportunities, and the limitation of inequalities in the distribution of other primary goods to those which will improve the absolute level of the worst-off group – by showing that they would be freely chosen by rational, mutually disinterested individuals placed in a (hypothetical) original position, in which they are given the task of determining the basic principles upon which a society that they might belong to will be governed.

Rawls's original position is characterized by the following features. There is an equality of power, information and rationality between its members; there is assumed to be a moderate degree of scarcity of material goods, such that whilst social co-operation is clearly beneficial, there are limits to the satisfaction of possible individual desires; it is accepted that any principles must be universal in their applicability, and publicly recognized; and its participants exist behind what he calls a 'veil of ignorance', in that they know nothing about themselves as individuals that would enable them to predict how they would be affected by any particular distributive principle. They are, however, allowed access to all *general* knowledge, contained in the laws or theories of economics, psychology and so on.

Apart from the similarities between this definition of the original position and Habermas's conception of an ideal speech-situation, there are a number of meta-ethical assumptions that appear to be shared by the two theorists. First, they both adopt what is often termed a 'pure

procedural' view of the justification of substantive normative principles. That is, a correct or right principle is defined as whatever would be the outcome of a certain set of procedural rules, which specify the conditions under which the relevant decision is to be taken. No procedure-independent criteria can be applied to judge the acceptability of this outcome.<sup>40</sup> Second, they both insist upon *unanimity* between the participants who engage in this procedure, as compared, say, with a majority-decision. Further, as will be seen shortly, such unanimity must not be achieved through compromise between otherwise conflicting interests. Third, there is a shared antipathy towards 'value-pluralism', the view that normative theories must remain content with specifying or justifying a number of distinct values or ideals which are, in certain circumstances, incompatible, and whose realization may therefore require partial sacrifices of some values when they conflict with others. For Rawls and Habermas there must be no trade-off relations between competing values: or at least, not unless there is some higher level principle which provides a rational and determinate solution to all such trade-off situations.<sup>41</sup>

I will now present a number of problems in Rawls's position which, I believe, indicate related difficulties for Habermas's. I will confine myself mainly to the question of the justificatory status of agreement in the original position, which is distinct from the other major question about Rawls's theory, whether it is true that the principles he specifies are in fact those that would be chosen. We can begin by considering the veil of ignorance assumption in the original position. It is significant that in earlier versions of his theory this feature was absent, and it appears to have been added later because without it, the choice-situation could not be shown to have a determinate outcome satisfying the requirement of unanimity.<sup>42</sup> That is, Rawls recognized that if the members of the original position knew of their individual abilities, motives, values, interests and suchlike, they would be unlikely to agree amongst themselves about the best principles of justice. For they would be able to judge that some principles would benefit or harm some of them more than they would others of them.

I believe that the veil of ignorance in Rawls's theory has the function of ensuring that only what are, in Habermas's terms, generalizable interests can be taken into account in the original position. But there are certain difficulties about this requirement in Rawls's theory. First, it tends to undermine the distinctness, or individuality, of the members of the original position; and in a way that makes the further requirement of unanimity (Habermas's consensus) redundant. For although Rawls continues to present the original position as if it involved debate leading to possible agreement between distinct individuals, it turns out that, in effect, no one of them can contribute anything to the discussion that is different from what any one else could. They are all equally rational, well-informed, influential and so on; and they have no individuating features which could give rise to even an initial level of disagreement. Thus the apparent diversity of individuals in effect conceals a complete impersonality, such that the relevant process of decision could be conducted by a single, though highly abstract, individual.

So there is a crucial tension in Rawls's theory between the requirement of unanimity and the individuality of the participants, which is resolved via the veil of ignorance in favour of the former. I shall return shortly to the relevance of this for Habermas's conception of generalizable interests. But I want first to point to a further difficulty in Rawls's theory, that is related to this tension.

Whilst Rawls wishes to ensure agreement, and thus de-individualizes the members of the original position by placing them behind the veil of ignorance, he sees that it is necessary to provide some motivational force for them in addition to what would otherwise be, in effect, a purely instrumental rationality. Part of his solution to this is the assumption of mutual disinterest: participants are said to be self-interested, but in such a way that they have no interest of either a positive or negative form in the extent to which others' interests are satisfied. But what content is to be given to these interests? For if none is provided, the participants, who are concerned with choosing principles of distribution, will have no idea what it is whose distribution matters to

them. Rawls's answer to this is his doctrine of primary goods which are defined, roughly, as those goods which are necessary for the successful practice of any possible rational life-plan; and of which it is true that the more one has of them, the better-off one will be.<sup>43</sup>

I shall not discuss what Rawls says about rational life-plans, since the issues raised by this would take us too far from the main concern here. But the basic idea behind the concept of primary goods seems to be this. Rawls wishes to allow that his individuals may turn out (when they emerge from the veil of ignorance) to have a great variety of particular interests and values. He cannot ascribe an actual diversity of these to the members of the original position, on pain of failure to produce unanimity. So instead he argues that the participants can identify a set of primary goods which, on the basis of their general knowledge, they know are such that whatever the particular life-plans they turn out to have, these are the goods whose amount will matter to them.

But there is a major problem here. The possible diversity of life-plans may be so great that no such list of goods could be determined. Alternatively – and this is the line I will follow – even if such a list could be agreed, it may well be insufficiently inclusive.<sup>44</sup> For although there may be some goods that everyone wants for whatever they choose to do with their lives, there may be other goods which are useful for only *some* such choices, and which might indeed prove to be more important than the universal goods. But if this is so individuals will discover (in their 'real lives') that their society has been organized on the basis of principles which, however acceptably they determine the distribution of these universal goods, fails to guarantee them what they need for their own actual life-plans, based on their particular values and interests.

To avoid this difficulty one would have to make the following assumption: that there is a set of goods which is not only universal in the sense of being advantageous for everyone's life-plans, but also includes *everything* that is important for *anyone's* life-plans. It seems to me extremely implausible that any such set exists, unless one is prepared to regard interests or values that are not shared by everyone as

in some way suspect or non-genuine. But this would require adopting a very stringent and debatable substantive normative doctrine about what are to be regarded as genuine or desirable human interests.

Just this kind of assumption, however, appears to be made by Habermas. For he says in the passage quoted earlier that in practical discourse the norms agreed upon will concern interests that are common, 'because the constraint-free consensus permits only what *all* can want'.<sup>45</sup> Now it is presumably true, other things being equal, that if a consensus that does not involve compromise is to be achieved, only interests that are common in this sense will be permissible bases for normative proposals. But if 'in fact' individuals in the ideal speech-situation also have interests that are not common, they may find the agreed proposals are either inadequate, in not dealing with issues that are significant for them, or actually undesirable, since their implementation conflicts with these individual interests. How then does Habermas justify the assumption that only common interests are relevant in practical discourse?

A clue to his answer to this is provided by another comment in the same passage. He says that by common or generalizable interests he means those 'that can be communicatively shared'.<sup>46</sup> I suspect this involves the following assumption: that interests which are genuinely communicable are those which everyone would accept as common interests, in an ideal form of communication. That is, communicability implies sharing in the sense of acceptance: the intersubjectivity of successful communication involves not just understanding, but *agreement*. That this is Habermas's view is indicated by the sense of the term he frequently uses when describing the 'understanding' towards which communicative activity is (necessarily) directed, *Verständigung*. McCarthy says of this, and its cognate terms, that:

Like their English counterparts, but more so, the German terms referring to understanding can typically be used in stronger and weaker senses, running the gamut from mere intelligibility to complete agreement. Thus we speak of understanding a word, sentence, argument; understanding what someone means with a

given utterance; understanding a person's intentions, feelings, desires; coming to an understanding with someone; having reached an understanding with someone; and so on.<sup>47</sup>

Without claiming that Habermas's view that communicable interests are shared interests founders upon ambiguity between these senses, it does appear to depend on the belief that understanding in the weaker senses must ultimately produce understanding in the stronger sense of agreement.<sup>48</sup> I see no good reason for accepting this. It would seem to imply that the successful use of language requires not merely the existence of shared meanings, intersubjectively maintained rules for the use of terms, but also shared beliefs. But those who deny the possibility of a universal and rationally justifiable set of normative principles will not accept this claim; and I do see how it can be established on the basis of a thesis about the shared character of linguistic meanings. If this is so, Habermas's optimism about the possibility of consensual outcomes of practical discourse is unfounded.

Habermas's view is, I suggest, related to another often manifested in arguments for the essentially shared, generalizable character of human needs or interests. It is sometimes claimed that once we recognize that humans are intrinsically social, or even co-operative, beings, we can show that certain kinds of conflictual relationships (such as those typical of capitalist societies) are not genuinely human: that in these relationships humans are operating as a-social individuals, and thus with distortions in their true nature. And in support of the claim that 'by their nature' humans are social, the centrality of phenomena such as language or economic productive activity are emphasized. (Something like this view is found, for instance, in Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, in his account of human species-being and its alienation.)

But this type of argument is mistaken: it trades upon an ambiguity between descriptive and normative senses of sociality. In the former sense it is certainly true that, for instance, the intersubjective, rule-governed character of language shows that humans are 'social'; and that some ontological theories about humans and society are therefore

wrong, namely those which see society as composed of relationships between pre- or non-social individuals. But it does not follow from this that, say, egotistic behaviour is non-human because it is 'non-social'. Both egotists and altruists are 'social' in the descriptive, ontological sense. The former use language, and engage in social relationships, just as much as the latter. To characterize them as 'non-' or even 'anti-social' involves a different sense of the term, referring to certain norms about desirable forms of human activity; and these cannot be justified by pointing to the (descriptively) social nature of humans.

I have been arguing that, corresponding to the difficulty in Rawls's theory that arises in the specification of primary goods — which is related to the tension between the individuality of people in the original position and the requirement of unanimous agreement — there is a similar difficulty in Habermas's view that only generalizable interests can or will emerge in the ideal speech-situation. I will conclude this discussion of his account of practical discourse by considering his attitude towards compromise. Habermas maintains that ideally consensus should not take this form, since agreements based on compromise arise only in situations where the interests of participants are not fully generalizable.<sup>49</sup> Thus compromises indicate an (in principle) eliminable imperfection in the rationality of normative decisions. But he also argues that, in such imperfect situations, it is still important to distinguish justifiable from non-justifiable compromises. The basis for this distinction is the equality of power between the competing parties: only where this exists is compromise genuine.<sup>50</sup>

It seems that Habermas associates this imperfect situation with a further departure from the ideal form of practical discourse, namely 'the competition for scarce goods', which he describes as involving a type of 'strategic action' that is distinct from the communicative consensus of fully rational discourse.<sup>51</sup> This suggests that by generalizable interests Habermas must mean not merely interests that everyone has, but interests whose satisfaction is compatible with the existing level of resources. But this involves some very problematic issues. It can I think be shown that competition

between individuals (or groups) for scarce resources can be overcome only in one or both of the following situations: where individual desires (whose satisfaction requires the use of material resources) have a finite upper limit, and the available resources are sufficient to meet these; or where individual desires are such that each person achieves satisfaction primarily through other people's desires being satisfied. Neither condition appears to me realistically achievable: nor do I see, even if either could be achieved, why this should be thought especially desirable.

I will not try to argue for these claims. Instead, I simply note that were they accepted, we should no longer regard compromise outcomes as a sign of imperfection. Rather, we should attempt to specify appropriate procedures for normative decisions that assume the ineliminability (either in fact, or ideally) of conflicting interests and competition for resources. In this context, Habermas's requirement of equal power for compromise to be legitimate is very important. Indeed, many of the features he specifies for an ideal speech-situation might well be preserved, but without the assumptions that support his advocacy of consensus, which founders in my view upon his belief in the rational harmony of genuine human interests, and in the necessity for uncompromising agreement as the outcome of undistorted communication.

## Conclusion

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I will conclude by first drawing together the main themes in this book, and then considering a number of possible difficulties in what I have said.

I began by arguing there were certain defects in critical theorists' critique of positivism, and of positivist social science in particular. Whilst it is true that the latter is epistemologically inadequate, since it denies the place of hermeneutic interpretation in social theory, and assumes a partly mistaken view of the natural sciences, it is wrong to claim that it presupposes scientism, and nor does it entail the practice of a scientific politics. Further, I argued that the doctrine of value-freedom, rejected by critical theorists as a central feature of positivism, can instead be seen as an important basis for the criticism of a scientific politics, and can be accepted without commitment to scientism. I then suggested how it was possible to conceive of social theories that are critical of social reality from a distinctively socialist standpoint, consistently with this kind of separation between science and value.

My attitude to these issues partly reflects a more general distrust of the assumption within critical theory that it is necessary to overcome or transcend a number of related dichotomies that find their paradigmatic expression in Kantian philosophy: between 'is' and 'ought', 'science' and 'values', 'theory' and 'practice', and so on. My own position, by contrast, tends to preserve these; whilst also (hopefully) preserving the potentially critical character of social theory. It seems to me that the only philosophical standpoint that succeeds in transcending these Kantian dichotomies is Hegel's. But the idealism of Hegel's philosophy is, I believe, essential to this 'success'. It is only through his rejection of the ultimate reality of the finite, material world, and his

conception of the world-historical development of the Idea, manifesting itself in a teleologically ordered succession of objectifications, that this transcendence can be achieved. Only if that which is can be deemed real solely in as much as it expresses that which ought to be (its implicit idea or notion), can the duality be (dialectically) overcome: without Hegel's idealism, no transcendence.<sup>1</sup> But I find little that is philosophically attractive about that idealism; and I do not share what seems in some people to be an antipathy towards any kind of duality as such. Idealist metaphysics is something that a critical social theory would do well to be without; and I think there are residual elements of it in much of the Frankfurt School's work, even that of Habermas.

Habermas's own critique of positivism relies partly, but only partly, on his theory of knowledge-constitutive interests. I have argued against this theory, and tried to show, amongst other things, that it in fact undermines the possibility of criticizing either positivist or hermeneutic social theories' adequacy to deal with the actual character of social reality. Instead, I think it preferable to adopt an objectivist, realist view of the differences between the 'objects' of various sciences; and I have suggested that a single dichotomy between humans and nature, as scientific objects, misrepresents the character of both. This dichotomy is associated with the way Habermas presents the ideal of emancipation as a movement from causality to freedom. But I have argued that this conception of autonomy can be reconstructed within a deterministic, reductionist framework.

Habermas's view that there are distinctive criteria of validity for critical social theory rests partly on the claim that the truth of such a theory is tied to its successful translation into practice. I have criticized this, and proposed instead that there are significant gaps between the truth of explanatory theories, the success of techniques, and the theoretical rationale for such techniques. As with my view of the relations between science and values, there is a more general basis for my attitude to these questions. I am sceptical of the way critical theorists (and several other traditions within Marxism) appear to present us with a single package comprising epistemology, a particular social theory, specific

forms of practice, and a normative ideal, all supposedly entailing or presupposing each other.

So, whilst Habermas conceives of critical social theory as involving a distinctive form of knowledge which is, in his terms, '*between science and philosophy*',<sup>2</sup> my own position instead represents such a theory as consisting of both science *and* philosophy. In other words, such a theory makes claims that are assessable as science; but the problems towards which it is directed, the aims which it attempts to achieve and, thus, the relevance or significance of its solutions, must be judged in terms of our answers to the kinds of specifically normative questions which have typically been examined within political philosophy. The critique of social reality must combine the realms of sciences and values, and not try to overcome their separation by employing some supposedly distinct form of knowledge or theory. Thus, to Habermas's early claim that:

The meaning of the actual historical process is revealed to the extent that we grasp a meaning, derived from 'practical reason', of what should be and what should be otherwise . . . and theoretically examine the presuppositions of its practical realization . . . [and we] must interpret the actual course and the social forces of the present form from the point of view of the realization of that meaning,<sup>3</sup>

my response is: yes, but this requires no 'new' form of social theory with distinctive criteria of validity.

Unlike many of his predecessors in the Frankfurt School, Habermas goes well beyond the incantation of Reason as the foundation of critique. He tries to spell out what is involved in the self-reflective movement towards autonomy; to specify a number of particular values which should be realized in social relationships; and to provide a rational justification for them through the presuppositions of communication. But I have argued that he does not altogether succeed in these tasks. It is questionable whether the mode of justification is tenable; and also whether the proposed values are adequate as a basis for resolving the kinds of normative issues inherent in social relationships. The failure is due partly, I think, to an over-simple contrast between humans and natural objects,

and partly also to a misplaced faith in the potential harmony between human needs or interests, which leads to a view of conflict or disagreement as expressing necessarily a state of imperfection. Such apparent optimism is not merely unrealistic. It may mis-direct our attention from constructing forms of social organization which, rather than aiming at consensus between perfectly rational homogeneous beings, attempt to equalize the effective power of differentiated groups and individuals, and to resolve their often incompatible demands without viewing these as signs of imperfection. It is inequality (in all its many forms), rather than individualism, that should be the main target for a socialist critique of capitalism.

Despite having confined myself only to certain areas of Habermas's work, my responses to them have involved adopting particular views on a very wide range of issues. Perhaps inevitably, I have often been content with articulating a position that I favour, making little attempt to defend it against significant objections. But there are certainly a number of problems in what I have said that I am to some extent conscious of, and it may be helpful to identify them now.

I have throughout argued from a realist standpoint, whilst also assuming a central role for hermeneutic interpretation in social theory. But there are several apparent difficulties here. First, my account of the relations between science and values makes no explicit reference to the interpretation of meanings; and it might be argued that this account cannot be applied to this kind of analysis. For, as several writers (such as Gadamer) have emphasized,<sup>4</sup> the interpretation of meanings is necessarily performed from within the conceptual framework of the interpreter's own language. So it is not possible to view the meanings identified through such analyses as 'objects' that exist independently of the interpretive framework employed: rather, they are in some way a product of the interaction between interpreter and interpreted. Further, it is apparently obvious that such frameworks are specific to particular groups, cultures, classes, historical periods and so on; and it is therefore unclear how any criteria for correct interpretations can be

provided that are framework-independent. But such frameworks are necessarily expressive of particular norms or values. So there cannot be any value-neutral descriptions of social meanings: such descriptions must presuppose, and implicitly express, the norms of the interpretive framework.

Second, it could be argued that even ignoring these problems for a realist, value-free interpretation of meanings, there are anyway major difficulties facing any form of realism even in the natural sciences. These basically concern the subject-dependence of perception: 'the world as perceived' is necessarily 'the world-as-perceived-by-someone'. Thus realism, if it is to be remotely plausible, must be formulated in such a way that, whilst recognizing the active, subject-determined character of perception, it none the less preserves the possibility of a scientific theory being tested by reference to perceptual evidence whose acceptance is logically independent of the truth of that theory. And it is far from clear whether this can be done.

In response to this I offer the following comments. First, I think it is reasonable to believe that certain elements of human perceptual processing mechanisms are 'innate', in the sense that, because of the character of the species' genetically transmitted information, they will develop in all humans except in highly abnormal 'environmental' circumstances.<sup>5</sup> This means that it must be accepted that 'the world as an object for humans' is in some way a humanly constructed world. There is no reason to believe that it is the same for all actual or possible perceiving beings; and there must be species-determined limits on the possibility of conceiving how that world might be for other types of being. Thus any adequate form of realism must accept at least this degree of subject-dependence of 'reality'.

However, the most difficult issues arise when we consider forms of subject-dependence that are not universal for the human species: those that may vary between groups or individuals. Again, I think it is reasonable to believe such differences exist, and that they result from certain learning experiences, including those that involve active bodily engagement with the environment.<sup>6</sup> But I am doubtful

whether, as a matter of fact, there are perceptual differences corresponding to every significant difference or disagreement between competing scientific theories.<sup>7</sup> Further, even if there are such differences, it is important to remember that not all results of past learning are irreversible: that is, it may still be possible to learn to see things differently. The problem remains, of course, of what if any sense can be given to learning to see them 'better'; and it is at this point that some form of pragmatism may seem an attractive alternative to realism.

One last point about realism. An important defect of the way this position has sometimes been presented within the philosophy of science is a lack of attention to the role of abstraction or idealization in the construction of scientific theories. By contrast, rationalist conceptions of science have rightly emphasized this, though in a way that has led to a total rejection of empirical evidence as an independent basis for determining the truth or falsity of theories: what empiricists regard as evidence, rationalists see as (mere) illustration.<sup>8</sup> It seems, historically, that the most successful scientific work has involved, at least initially, a considerable divorce between development of the central theoretical concepts and their inter-relationships, and their referential application to 'concrete phenomena'. Galileo's mechanics is an obvious example. However, I think it is wrong to regard abstraction as incompatible with empirical testability; and, in terms of the logic of theory-testing, the abstract nature of 'pure' theories should be understood as one amongst other important reasons why no such tests are possible without the aid of auxiliary hypotheses.<sup>9</sup>

I turn now to another set of problems, which concern the form of reductionism espoused in chapter 4, and the conceptualization there of the relations between the 'physical' and 'psychic' dimensions of human existence. It might be objected that my position involves an archaic Cartesian dualism, differing from this only in adopting an epiphenomenalist rather than an interactionist view. In using the term 'archaic', I have in mind the commonplace observation that this traditional dualism between the mental and the physical has now been 'replaced' in philosophy by a

proper focus upon language, rather than consciousness, as the crucial feature of humans for the epistemology of social theory. An important feature of this philosophical transformation has been the rejection of the Cartesian (private) subject: the starting-point for human ontology is not the individual's logically private inner consciousness, but the public, rule-governed language of social reality. The interpretation of social meanings thus replaces the traditional, psychologistic problem of knowledge of minds.<sup>10</sup> Further, it might be objected that there is an inconsistency in the way I both endorse the significance of hermeneutics, and yet discuss the question of reductionism from this Cartesian standpoint.

As a partial reply to this, I suggest the following. First, I have tried to avoid any straightforward dualism between the physical and the mental. In particular, I have argued that it is necessary at least to make differentiations within both of these traditional categories, so that we can recognize the diversity of forms of organic and inorganic existence, and also their relatedness.<sup>11</sup> Thus, in the case of the human species I proposed that we should emphasize not only its distinctive characteristics – such as language, and the capacity for self-reflection – but also others that are to some extent shared with other species which are themselves distinct both from one another, and from inorganic beings. I suggested also that the existence of language may affect the nature of some of these (otherwise) shared characteristics, such as the emotions, though without any proper elaboration of this view.

Further, I am not convinced that the (quite legitimate) emphasis upon the social character of language should be seen as requiring us to replace or abandon the concept of individual states of consciousness. It still seems to me possible, and even necessary, to maintain a distinction between the 'psychological' facts of individuals' having certain experiences (perceptual, emotional, cognitive and so on), and the 'linguistic' or 'conceptual' elements involved in the identification of their contents. So, whilst it is true that the kinds of experiences available to humans are at least partly a function of the specific, socially determined

conceptual frameworks within which they operate, this does not rule out thinking of individual humans as the subjects of such experiences. Without some concept of individual experience, I find it difficult to make sense of myself; and this is one reason why I am unconvinced both by traditional philosophical materialism, and by the more recent forms of 'materialism' (previously called 'idealism') which attempt to 'de-centre the human subject' through a structuralist social ontology.<sup>12</sup>

There are also certain problems in my (compatibilist) account of autonomy as the absence of compulsiveness. It might be argued that this account has little to say about the actual character of the self-reflective process through which autonomy is achieved; and that when this is properly understood, it becomes clear that my compatibilist position is mistaken, since the process cannot be conceptualized within a deterministic framework.

What I have in mind here is this. Any self-reflective process can be characterized from a 'first-person' standpoint: that is, from the perspective of someone who is actually engaged in it. And there is a radical difference between the way human agents can, or perhaps must, view their own activities, and the way these can be viewed by others. From the standpoint of the agent, future actions are open to deliberation, choice and decision; and they are related to the present in the mode of intentionality, as things that one may aim to do. Correspondingly, to the extent that one is aware of various features of one's past and present, these are at least partly conceived in the form of possible reasons for (future) action. This first-person framework is non-deterministic: though reasons for action may be seen as causes by an observer, the agent cannot view them in this way; though one's intentions to act may be taken as the basis for predictions by an observer, they cannot be thus conceived by the agent; and whilst an observer may try to work out what one will do, and why, the process of decision and action cannot be viewed in these terms by the agent whilst engaged in that process. Thus the concept and attitudes of a deterministic standpoint cannot be employed 'in the first-person', but only 'in the third-person'.<sup>13</sup>

Though I am unsure whether this objection shows that determinism is unacceptable, I do think it points to important features of human agency. Further, it might be thought to suggest a way of conceptualizing how, for critical theorists, a social theory should be related to human practice. A critical social theory, it could be said, must be designed to enter into the self-reflective processes of groups or individuals; and this involves a quite different relationship to practice than the making of predictions about the outcomes of possible courses of action, which is all that positivist social theory can offer. Thus a positivist social theory is related to action in a different way from a critical social theory: it does not adopt the standpoint of the self-reflective agents of change, but views everything and everyone from the external, objectifying standpoint of a disengaged observer.

But it seems to me that the relationship of theory to practice advocated here is impossible: one is either an 'observer', or an 'agent', and there is no way of bridging or transcending the gap between these two perspectives. This is not to say that, from the standpoint of agency, 'objectifying' theories are of no use. It is certainly possible to produce theoretical knowledge which is helpful for human agents. But to do this is something different from being actually involved in the processes of deliberation and action. One can construct theories about something, or one can be engaged in deciding whether to do it; but one cannot, as it were, theorize in the mode of agency. Critical social theorists have to decide which it is that, at any particular point in their lives, they are to do; but they cannot have it both ways at once.

There is another, quite different, objection that might be made to my account of autonomy and self-reflection: that it involves a mistakenly 'intellectual', 'cognitivist' view of therapeutic processes and their emancipatory goals. In particular, the proposed analysis of compulsiveness, and thus of autonomy, suggests an ideal of rational self-control according to which any influences upon one's actions that are beyond the power of reasoning and decision are regarded as 'compulsive'.<sup>14</sup> But this would imply that, for instance, all emotions and desires are either inherently compulsive 'intrusions' upon rational, autonomous action, or that they

are only not so when themselves 'freely chosen' – and both alternatives are unacceptable.

This objection has considerable force, and I do not see how to reconstruct the concepts of self-reflection and autonomy to take account of it. What seems reasonably clear to me is that, at the very least, one must avoid a purely cognitive model of the therapeutic process as the gaining of self-understanding. This is partly just because such processes are as a matter of fact usually quite ineffectual. The caricature of people who spend their lives on the couch, come to understand themselves profoundly, and change in no other way (the Woody Allen syndrome), is well-founded. Therapeutic processes that change the way one lives are typically, amongst other things, both painful and exciting. And their emancipatory outcomes cannot be characterized adequately in terms of the realization of 'reason', at least if this concept is understood, as it usually is, partly in terms of various contrasts such as that between reason and feeling, emotion and so on.

But even were one to succeed in constructing a conception of (therapeutic) emancipation that avoided this rationalist bias, many of the central normative issues in social philosophy would remain unresolved. As I argued earlier,<sup>15</sup> it is not possible to articulate and justify the distinctive character of a socialist society by reference to a psychoanalytically derived concept of autonomy; and the same is true of attempts to do this by reference to the supposedly presupposed values of communicative activity, or of scientific enquiry.<sup>16</sup> I have made no attempt to offer an alternative form of justification. But the account I have suggested of the epistemology of a critical social theory at least has the virtue, I believe, of not making the criteria of validity of such theories logically dependent upon the acceptance of values which, so far as I can see, have not been adequately specified or substantiated by critical theorists themselves.

## Notes

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*In all quotations in the main text, the square brackets denote comments, explications, etc., added by the present author.*

*For full publication details see the Bibliography, p.224.*

### INTRODUCTION

1 See, e.g. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*; Marcuse, *Negations and Reason and Revolution*. A good account of the early period of the School is Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*.

2 For an excellent critical presentation of the whole range of Habermas's writings, see McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas*. References to particular works by Habermas will be given as they are discussed later.

3 A useful guide to this tradition is Outhwaite, *Understanding Social Life*. On positivist social science, see Keat and Urry, *Social Theory as Science*; Benton, *Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies*; and Keat, 'Positivism and Statistics in Social Science'.

4 See, respectively, Habermas's *Legitimation Crisis* and *Communication and the Evolution of Society*.

5 What follows is strongly influenced by the account of critical social theory in Fay, *Social Theory and Political Practice*.

6 Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p.67.

7 *Ibid.*, p.36.

8 Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p.8.

9 *Ibid.*, p.8.

10 Habermas, *Human Interests*, p.271.

11 *Ibid.*, p.272.

12 *Ibid.*, p.214.

13 See especially Habermas, 'On Systematically Distorted Communication'; 'Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence'; and 'What is Universal Pragmatics?'

14 See McCarthy, *Habermas*, ch. 4. for a discussion of these areas of Habermas's work, and the relevant references.

- 13 Popper, 'Science: Conjectures and Refutations', pp.34-45. But Popper has a further criticism, on p.38, footnote 3, of the 'theory-loadedness' of clinical evidence, which I do not discuss.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p.35.
- 15 See ch. 3, sec. 1, above.
- 16 Freud, 'Character and Anal Erotism', p.215.
- 17 Habermas, *Human Interests*, p.266.
- 18 On transference in psychoanalysis see, e.g., Brown and Pedder, *Introduction to Psychotherapy*, pp. 58-66. Freud discusses its central importance in, e.g. *Introductory Lectures*, lecture 27.
- 19 Habermas, *Human Interests*, p.261.
- 20 *Ibid.*, pp.261-2.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p.269.
- 22 *Ibid.*, pp.267-9.
- 23 Cf. Freud's discussion of the prospects for therapeutic success in his *New Introductory Lectures*, lecture 34.
- 24 Fay, *Social Theory*, ch.5.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p.108.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p.102.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp.108-9.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p.95.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p.95, footnote 6; see also p.100, footnote 8.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p.100.
- 31 Useful accounts of the many post-Freudian forms of psychotherapy are Kovel, *A Complete Guide to Therapy*, Part Two; and Brown and Pedder, *Introduction to Psychotherapy*, Part II.
- 32 See the discussion of this point in ch. 1, sec. 3, above.

#### 6: THE COMPLEXITY OF NORMS IN PRACTICE

- 1 I continue to use these terms for convenience, whilst noting the qualifications to their usual sense mentioned on p.160 above.
- 2 On behaviour-modification, see e.g. Kovel, *A Complete Guide to Therapy*, pp.210-20.
- 3 See, e.g. Belliveau and Richter, *Understanding Human Sexual Inadequacy*.
- 4 See Reich, *The Function of the Orgasm*, and *Character Analysis*. See Lowen, *Bioenergetics*, for one important development of Reich's earlier therapeutic ideas.
- 5 See Reich, *Character Analysis*, ch. 14.

- 6 Such as Southgate and Randall, *The Barefoot Psychoanalyst*.
- 7 Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment'.
- 8 See, e.g. Kovel, *A Complete Guide to Therapy*, ch. 12; and Brown and Pedder, *Introduction to Psychotherapy*, pp.166-180.
- 9 See Keat, 'A Critical Examination of Skinner's Objections to Mentalism'.
- 10 Cf. Keat and Urry, *Social Theory as Science*, pp.159-67.
- 11 See, e.g. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, pp.25-32
- 12 See ch. 4, section 1, above.
- 13 McCarthy, *Habermas*, p.378; see also pp.377-86 for a useful discussion of this issue. One should note also Habermas's espousal of an apparently interest-free form of knowledge in what he calls the 'rational-reconstructive' sciences: on this see McCarthy, *Habermas*, pp.276-79; and Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, pp.22-4, and 'What is Universal Pragmatics?', pp.8-20.
- 14 See McCarthy, *Habermas*, pp.272-333, for an excellent account of this.
- 15 See Habermas, 'Theory of Communicative Competence', and 'What is Universal Pragmatics?'.
- 16 Habermas, 'What is Universal Pragmatics?', p.3.
- 17 Quoted in McCarthy, *Habermas*, p.292, but with no reference: I believe it is from Habermas's (untranslated) '*Warheitstheorien*' (full reference in McCarthy, *Habermas*, p.443).
- 18 Habermas, 'Postscript', p.170.
- 19 Quoted and translated from '*Warheitstheorien*' by McCarthy, *Habermas*, p.299.
- 20 Habermas, 'Postscript', pp.166-72; but cf. my comments on pp.77-8 above.
- 21 See McCarthy, *Habermas*, pp.303-04, for some relevant criticisms.
- 22 Supported, I think, by Habermas's remarks in *Theory and Practice*, p.20, and *Legitimation Crisis*, p.107.
- 23 Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, pp.25-6.
- 24 Apel, *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*, pp.256-85.
- 25 So we here 'return' to the point at which I left unspecified a possible argument for the normative presuppositions of engagement in scientific practice, on p.48 above.
- 26 Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p.108.
- 27 See Freud, 'Character and Anal Erotism'.
- 28 e.g. Watson, *The Double Helix*.
- 29 See, e.g. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, vol. II; and Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

- 30 Feyerabend, *Against Method*.
- 31 See, e.g. Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, ch. 8; and Sampson, *Liberty and Language*. Cf. my review of the latter, in 'Chomsky's Politics'.
- 32 See Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', section VIII, for a classic defence of this view; and cf. pp.191-2 below.
- 33 Habermas, 'Theory of Communicative Competence', p.372.
- 34 Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p.107.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p.108.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p.110.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p.108.
- 38 Habermas, *Communication*, p.184.
- 39 I shall focus almost entirely on Part One of this book. A helpful introductory account of Rawls's theory is S. Gorovitz, 'John Rawls: Theory of Justice'.
- 40 See Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, section 14. I am excluding, however, his claim that procedural outcomes must be 'tested' in relation to what he calls 'considered judgments': see *ibid.*, section 9.
- 41 See Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, section 7. On the idea of trade-off relations in political philosophy, see Barry, *Political Argument*, pp.3-8.
- 42 See Wolff, *Understanding Rawls*, for an interesting account of the development of Rawls's position.
- 43 See Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, section 15.
- 44 See Nagel, 'Rawls on Justice', and Teitelman, 'The Limits of Individualism', for discussions of this issue.
- 45 Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p.108.
- 46 *Ibid.*, p.108.
- 47 McCarthy, *Habermas*, p.428, footnote 37.
- 48 See Habermas, 'What is Universal Pragmatics?', p.3.
- 49 See his discussion of the 'separation of powers' in *Legitimation Crisis*, p.111.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p.112.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p.113.

## CONCLUSION

- 1 So I am generally sympathetic to Colletti's position, in *Marxism and Hegel*.
- 2 The title of a paper now forming ch. 6 of his *Theory and Practice*.
- 3 Quoted by McCarthy in his introduction to Habermas, *Communication*, p.x.

- 4 See the account of Gadamer's exchanges with Habermas in McCarthy, *Habermas*, pp.162-93.
- 5 See, e.g. Rose, *The Conscious Brain*, pp.126-34 and 203-18; and Hilgard et al., *Introduction to Psychology*, pp.141-5. Cf. the comments on 'innateness' on pp.122-3 above.
- 6 See e.g. Gregory, *Eye and Brain*, chs. 11 and 12; and Hilgard et al., *Introduction to Psychology*, pp.145-8.
- 7 My view here is influenced by Hooker, 'Empiricism, Perception and Conceptual Change'.
- 8 Cf. pp.19-20 above.
- 9 Cf. ch. 5, sec. 1, above.
- 10 On this development in the philosophy of social science, see Apel, *Analytical Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften*, ch. 4.
- 11 See ch. 3, sec. 4, above.
- 12 See, e.g. Adlam et al., 'Psychology, Ideology, and the Human Subject'.
- 13 See Hampshire, *Thought and Action*, for an account of these and related contrasts.
- 14 See ch. 4, sec. 3, above.
- 15 See ch. 6, sec. 1, above.
- 16 See ch. 6, sec. 2, and ch. 2, sec. 2, above.